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The Warren Campaign’s Antitrust Proposals 
Herbert Hovenkamp 
Senator Warren’s proposals seek to protect older technologies at the 
expense of consumers and workers. 
Antitrust policy promises to be an important issue in the 2020 presidential election, and for 
good reason. Market power as measured by price-cost margins has been on the rise since 
the 1980s. Unreasonably high margins reduce output, causing higher prices for consumers 
and fewer jobs for labor. 
Responding to concern about increasing market power, presidential candidate U.S. 
Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) has recently offered two proposals directed at large 
tech platforms. 
One proposal would designate large platform-based companies such as Amazon as 
“platform utilities” and prohibit them from selling their own merchandise on the platform 
in competition with other sellers. This “structural separation” rule would apply to 
platforms that exceed $25 billion in annual revenue, including Amazon, Google, and 
Facebook. Smaller platforms would not be required to separate structurally but would 
be placed under a standard of “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory dealing” with third-
party merchants. These rules could be enforced by both government agencies and private 
parties. 
Senator Warren’s second proposal would reverse “illegal and anti-competitive tech 
mergers,” focusing on large platform acquisitions of smaller firms. Her 
statement identifies Amazon and Whole Foods as such a merger, as well as 
Facebook’s acquisition of messaging company WhatsApp. 
Both Warren proposals express concerns about privacy as well as competition. The 
proposals are populist and resemble, in two respects, the approach taken by the Trump 
Administration on climate change. First, the Warren proposals largely ignore the 
mainstream understanding of the problem. Second, although the proposals sound simple, 
they mask complex issues and are likely to produce unintended results. Structural antitrust 
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remedies are easy to articulate and they have been a feature of heavy-handed antitrust 
policy since the early twentieth century. For example, a 1912 antitrust decree broke the 
Standard Oil monopoly into 34 smaller firms. But a few years later, the Federal Trade 
Commission was obliged to issue a report explaining why gasoline prices rose so 
dramatically after the breakup. 
Why would a Warren Administration focus on large tech platforms? Although monopoly is 
a serious problem and margins have grown rapidly since the 1980s, the increases have 
mainly occurred in markets for manufactured products (such as cars), breakfast cereal, 
steel, airlines, household goods (such as batteries), and beer. By contrast, most of Google’s 
products are sold at a price of zero to consumers, although businesses pay for advertising. 
Amazon has very low margins in comparison to other retailers. Furthermore, the firms that 
the Warren proposal targets have high consumer satisfaction ratings and some of them, 
such as Amazon, have exhibited significant growth at the expense of traditional brick-and-
mortar retail. 
Senator Warren’s proposal is thus similar to the Trump Administration’s strategy of 
protecting coal at the expense of sustainable energy sources. Both strategies favor older 
technologies in danger of being displaced—fossil fuel companies in the case of the Trump 
Administration and traditional retail firms in the Warren proposal. 
Who gains from Senator Warren’s first proposal to keep large platform companies from 
selling their own merchandise? Not consumers or labor, both of whom benefit from high 
output and low prices. Indeed, the text of the Warren proposal is largely indifferent to 
output or pricing—and may even lead to lower output and higher prices. The statement 
outlining the proposal justifies its prohibition by citing Progressive Era rules that required 
structural separation of public utilities from ordinary businesses. But utilities at that time, 
including railroads, were subject to price regulation. A price-regulated utility’s expansion 
into unregulated markets—for instance, when railroads acquired coal mines or hotels—
created opportunities for manipulating the costs of its regulated business. By contrast, if it 
is not subject to price regulation, a company’s “vertical” integration of inputs and outputs 
can be good for competition. For example, oil refiners also sell gasoline in order to prevent 
price fixing by independent gasoline stations. 
Firms also vertically integrate their distribution in order to eliminate price premiums that 
result from trademarks or entrenched brands. One very popular example is 
“AmazonBasics” house brand of consumer batteries, which are just as good as but much 
cheaper than branded batteries such as Energizer or Duracell. Energizer is owned by a 
holding company which also makes Rayovac and Eveready. Duracell is owned by 
Berkshire-Hathaway. Both are large publicly-traded firms with high price-cost margins. 
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House brands such as AmazonBasics allow customers to avoid paying high prices for the 
trademarks of other large companies. And when house brands are sold in competition with 
branded goods, as they are on Amazon, they also force name brands to cut their own prices. 
But under Senator Warren’s proposal, Amazon could no longer sell AmazonBasics batteries 
in competition with these brands. The proposal faults house brands for copying the goods 
of others. To be sure, intellectual property laws are not always effective at preventing 
copying. Nevertheless, making a cheaper generic copy of another firm’s trademarked brand 
is not any kind of theft at all. Rather, it serves consumers by giving them the opportunity to 
avoid paying for a trademark or name that they do not want. The result is less monopoly, 
not more. 
Senator Warren’s proposed exception for smaller platforms—allowing them to market 
both their goods and those of competitors—misunderstands the relationship between 
company size and market power. Amazon is a very large platform, but that is because it 
reportedly sells more than three billion products worldwide. For most individual products, 
Amazon’s market share is small. A more specialized vendor that sells only, say, computer 
printers might have much lower overall sales volume but a much larger footprint in that 
product—and consequently, greater market power. The distinction Senator Warren’s 
proposal makes based merely on company size makes no sense unless it is tied to a 
particular share of a product. 
Senator Warren’s second proposal, which would keep large platforms from acquiring 
smaller firms, identifies a serious problem: large platforms are undertaking numerous 
acquisitions of smaller companies, some of which are or could become competitors. The 
problem is severe because predicting anticompetitive effects in individual cases is so 
difficult.  On the one hand, such mergers can be procompetitive if they enable a large firm 
to improve its product offerings. On the other hand, small acquired firms might develop in 
the future into important competitors, but their acquisition prevents this from happening. 
One promising remedy to this problem is to limit larger companies’ technology acquisitions 
to nonexclusive licenses. That way, the firm can obtain any technology that the smaller firm 
has to offer, but it cannot acquire the right to exclude rivals from using the technology. 
The Warren proposal, however, does not do this. Instead, it disapproves of mergers such as 
the one between Amazon and Whole Foods, which almost certainly benefit both consumers 
and labor. The Amazon-Whole Foods merger places rival grocery chains under pressure to 
innovate. For example, Walmart is now expanding its offerings to include delivery and 
other services. 
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Any time a merger or other practice reduces a firm’s costs or improves its products or 
services, it boosts competition by putting pressure on obsolete or less efficient rivals. But 
protecting these rivals should not be the purpose of the antitrust laws. Rather, the focus of 
antitrust laws should be on maximizing output, which benefits both consumers and 
workers. 
In that respect, the Warren proposals are also notable for what they do not say. One stark 
deficiency is the lack of concern about high consumer prices, even though Senator 
Warren madeher career promoting the protection of consumers. Nevertheless, her 
proposal ignores them and is more concerned about protecting inefficient, higher cost 
competitors. 
Another problem is the lack of any concern about labor, whose wages have not come close 
to keeping pace with corporate earnings. Rather than looking out for competitors, antitrust 
policy should encourage maximum output, which helps both consumers and labor by 
providing more opportunities for jobs. If policymakers are truly concerned about workers, 
then they should urge that anticompetitive practices in labor markets receive greater 
attention from antitrust enforcers. 
Not only are consumers and labor two of the Democratic Party’s most important and 
vulnerable constituencies, their protection is what should be driving antitrust policy for 
both parties. 
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